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Abstract 
 
Using a panel data set of 14 EU countries from 1970 to 2012, we study the type of 
monetary and fiscal policies of both authorities, and assess how they are influenced by 
certain economic variables and events (the Maastricht Treaty, the Stability and Growth 
Pact, the Euro and crises). Results show that inflation has a significant impact on 
monetary policy, and that governments raise their primary balances when facing 
increases in debt. Another goal is to characterise the type of interactions established 
between central banks and national governments, i.e. if their policies complement one 
another, or whether there is a more dominant one. Still, our results point to the lack of 
evidence concerning central banks’ response to fiscal policy. 
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1. Introduction 
On the 7
th
 of February 1992, the Maastricht Treaty was signed, which was the 
first step towards a common currency among the member states of the European Union 
(EU). This treaty was established following convergence criteria which each member 
state was obliged to comply with, based on rules on budget deficit and debt levels, low 
inflation and interest rates close to the EU average. Thus, it contributed towards 
achieving price stability and fiscal sustainability.  
However, these Maastricht provisions did not seem to be sufficient enough to 
deal with excessive deficits, which led to the formation of other procedures to 
complement the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In 1997, 
members from the EU agreed to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), a set of fiscal 
rules for maintaining and reinforcing low budget deficits, whereby annual government 
budget deficit and government debt may not exceed 3% and 60% of GDP, respectively. 
Finally, the third stage of the EMU took place on the 1
st
 of January 1999, with the 
launch of a common single currency, the Euro, which was to be used as the monetary 
unit for all transactions by January 2002.  
Despite all the advantages that these three economic milestones brought about, 
they restricted the use of fiscal policy, especially when countries joined the Euro area, 
lost their individual monetary policy, and became aligned to a common monetary 
policy. This leads us to need to think about the relationship created between a country’s 
fiscal and monetary policies.  
The interactions between fiscal policy and monetary policy are a complex topic 
to study, as the role of each authority has a different impact on the economy, which 
could be the reason why equilibrium under these two policies is similarly difficult to 
determine. Thus, the type of relationship established by both authorities is important in 
determining how their policies will influence the levels of inflation, debt and economic 
growth, in other words, all the aspects that are related to the economic performance of a 
country. 
Through this study, our intention is to analyse the impact of certain economic 
variables on these policies, and to determine whether there is evidence, or not, of 
Ricardian fiscal regimes. Subsequently, through the reaction functions of each authority, 
we will also be able to define their main goals and the type of interaction that exists 
between national governments and central banks. Finally, we plan to see how the 
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Maastricht Treaty, the SGP, the Euro and crises have influenced monetary and fiscal 
policies. 
For a sample of 14 European countries during the period of 1970-2012, we 
performed a panel data analysis, which took into account the impact that these policies 
have on all of the countries, on average. Our results show that inflation is quite relevant 
for monetary policy, and that primary balance reacts positively to increases in 
government debt. Moreover, our results point to the lack of evidence concerning central 
banks’ response to fiscal policy. 
Furthermore, in relation to these events, the estimation results are all statistically 
significant for monetary and fiscal policies, but the dummy for the Maastricht Treaty 
shows that it has the biggest impact on monetary policy, probably due to the 
convergence criteria. On the other hand, the introduction of the Euro has a greater 
negative effect on fiscal policy, together with that of a rise in countries’ budget deficits. 
As we expected, crises influence monetary and fiscal policies negatively, but this effect 
is smoothed out if countries belong to the Euro area. In addition, we also made 
individual analyses for each country.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief theoretical and 
empirical analysis of the background literature, emphasising the different policies and 
the degree of economic coordination; Section 3 explains the empirical specifications, 
namely the data and variables used in the model, as well as the econometric approaches 
chosen; Section 4 details the regressions that were estimated, as well as the empirical 
results; Section 5 summarises the conclusions. 
 
2. Literature and Theoretical Background 
2.1. Different Policies and Economic Coordination 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, discussion regarding the roles of central banks 
and governments, as well as the relationship between monetary and fiscal authorities, 
started to gain more relevance. Although there is a separation of responsibilities – 
central banks are focused on inflation, whereas governments are concerned with cyclical 
conditions and the level of government indebtedness – both inflation and cyclical 
conditions depend on policy coordination, which means that monetary and fiscal 
policies depend on each other (Wyplosz, 1999). 
However, this coordination may not always lead to the most desirable results, 
which consequently depends on the role assumed by each authority. Sargent and 
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Wallace (1981) argued that both authorities could be relevant in a “dominant” way. 
When monetary policy dominates fiscal policy, the monetary authority can permanently 
control inflation, as it is free to set the level for base money. However, if fiscal policy 
dominates monetary policy then the monetary authority loses some of its influence in 
controlling inflation, and since budget deficits cannot only be financed by the issue of 
new bonds, then the monetary authority has to print money and address the additional 
problem of inflation. 
Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) introduced the distinction between Ricardian and 
non-Ricardian regimes, which characterises the behaviour of a government. In a non-
Ricardian regime, primary budget balances are freely set by the government and prices 
are endogenously determined from the government’s budget constraints. Hence, the 
fiscal authority does not commit to completely financing debt through future taxes, thus 
leading to monetary financing. In a Ricardian regime, the monetary authority 
determines the stock of money and the price level, and the government has to achieve a 
certain degree of primary budget surplus in order for the budget constraint to be 
consistent with the repayment of the initial stock of debt and to ensure fiscal solvency. 
According to Leeper (1991), fiscal policy could be “active” or “passive”, 
depending on the effect it will have when facing a government debt shock. An active 
authority discards the state of government debt and independently establishes a decision 
rule that depends on past, current and future variables. On the other hand, a passive 
authority’s decision rule depends on the current state of government debt once it has 
been constrained by the active authority’s actions and by the private optimisation. 
Taylor (1993) further addressed the estimation of policy reaction function by 
initially proposing a monetary policy rule to control inflation for the U.S. in the early 
1990s: 
 
*)(*)(* yyrr   . (1) 
 
In the so-called Taylor rule, equation (1), r  represents the actual nominal short 
term interest rate, *r  the equilibrium nominal short term interest rate,   the actual rate 
of inflation, *  the equilibrium rate of inflation, y  the actual output and *y  the 
capacity output. As Ghatak and Moore (2011) state, whilst this rule describes the 
changes in the instruments that would accompany an increase in inflation or in real 
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GDP, its aim is to allow central banks to be successful in stabilising inflation and output 
gap. Later on, after the establishment of the EMU, many authors concluded that the 
Taylor rule is a useful tool for conducting monetary policy in the Union and that it 
provides a similar level of macroeconomic stabilisation, when compared with the 
optimal rule (Gerlach and Schnabel, 2000). 
 On the other hand, when dealing with fiscal issues, the key player is the 
government. Based on its intertemporal budget constraint and assuming the necessary 
and sufficient transversality condition, the government must determine a sustainable 
fiscal rule in the medium and long term:
1
 
 
11   tttt brdb , (2) 
 
where tb  is the public debt in year t, tr  is the real interest rate in t, 1ttbr  are the interest 
payments at the beginning of fiscal year t-1, and 1111   tttt sgd   is the ratio of the 
government primary balance to GDP generated during t-1, in which g is the 
government expenditure net of interest,   are the tax revenues net of transfers and s  
denotes the real revenues from seigniorage, assumed to be constant. In equation (2), and 
knowing that the primary balance can be a deficit or a surplus, the change in the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio must cover not only the primary balance to GDP ratio but also 
interest payments. 
 
2.2. Previous Empirical Evidence 
The reading of the available empirical literature shows that, several authors 
focussed either on the monetary or on the fiscal side, on the interactions between them, 
or on their impact on a country’s economy. 
Concerning the study of fiscal policy and its sustainability, the studies looked 
essentially at two main indicators: debt and primary balance. In Bohn (1998), the U.S. 
primary budget surplus turned out to be an increasing function and it responded 
positively to the debt-to-GDP ratio, which shows that U.S. fiscal policy satisfies an 
intertemporal budget constraint, in a Ricardian fashion. Galí and Perotti (2003) study 
how the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP changed the fiscal policy in EMU countries by 
                                                          
1
 See Afonso (2005) and Landolfo (2008) for more developments on the intertemporal budget constraint. 
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making them more procyclical, and they also detect a decrease in cyclically primary 
deficits when facing an increase in debt. On the other hand, Afonso (2005) uses 
causality tests between the primary balance and government debt ratios. The results of 
the various tests show that for all the sub-periods (pre- and post-Maastricht Treaty and 
SGP periods) between 1970 and 2003, the 15 EU governments raised the primary 
budget surpluses as a result of increases in the outstanding stock of government debt, 
and they appears to use primary budget surpluses to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Therefore, we can acknowledge an evidence of Ricardian fiscal regime in these papers. 
Moving to monetary policy, it can be observed that reaction functions are 
usually based on interest rates. Altavilla (2003) estimates several reaction functions
2
 in 
order to assess how the European Central Bank (ECB) should control interest rates 
when facing a change in real output, inflation or the exchange rate. The conclusions are 
that: 1) central bank behaviour is better explained by adding a lagged interest rate and 
also future inflation movements; 2) the ECB should focus on simple monetary rules, as 
this increases the transparency and the credibility of the institution itself. Ruth (2007) 
develops a panel reaction function based on the Taylor rule for analysing the European 
monetary policy, namely, interest rate setting since 1999. Regarding the good’s interest 
rate path, in the short-term, the author only finds deviation by the ECB in cases of area-
wide inflation. Clausen and Hayo (2002) also find asymmetric monetary policy effects 
over the short- and medium-term for Germany, Italy and France. 
Furthermore, besides just measuring an interest rate reaction function for 8 
major EMU countries between 1980 and 1998, Huchet’s (2003) main goal is to 
determine whether common monetary policy shocks induce asymmetric reactions on the 
real economic activity of each country.  His conclusion is that “(...) a common change 
of monetary policy in all countries can lead to asymmetric reactions because these 
countries still have different national structures”. 
To study the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies, Leeper and 
Davig (2009) estimate Markov-switching policy rules for the United States. The paper’s 
results highlight that the impacts of a fiscal stimulus cannot be understood without 
studying monetary and fiscal policies jointly, since they fluctuate between active and 
passive behaviour. A similar approach is provided by Afonso and Toffano (2013) who 
report for the UK “active” and “passive” fiscal regimes in a clearer cut way, while in 
                                                          
2
 Five different rules are estimated: three different specifications of the Taylor rule, an optimal feedback 
rule and a forward-looking rule. 
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Germany fiscal regimes have been overall less active, supporting more fiscal 
sustainability. For Italy, a more passive fiscal behaviour is uncovered in the run-up to 
EMU.  
 
3. Empirical Specifications 
3.1. Data and Variables 
For the time period between 1970 and 2012 (43 years of annual observations), 
our dataset is based on 14 EU countries, where 11 belong to the Euro area
3
 – Austria 
(AT), Belgium (BE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Ireland 
(IE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT) and Spain (ES) – and the other 3 
are not part of the Euro area – Denmark (DK), Sweden (SE) and the United Kingdom 
(UK).  
  The variables used in the analysis are from several sources. From the European 
Commission AMECO database we gathered data regarding cyclically adjusted primary 
balance (capb), debt-to-GDP ratio (debt), nominal short-term interest rate (interest) and 
output gap between actual and potential gross domestic product (output gap); from the 
World Development Indicators (WDI) we obtained inflation (inflation); from the 
Financial Development and Structure dataset of the World Bank we collected M3 data, 
also referred to as liquid liabilities (m3). Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for 
the full sample. 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics (full sample): 1970 - 2012 
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Observations 
capb 
(% of GDP) 
0.963 3.354 
-25.033 
(IE, 2010) 
10.457 
(DK, 1986) 
447 
debt 
(% of GDP) 
58.451 29.162 
6.147 
(FI, 1974) 
170.306 
(GR, 2011) 
565 
interest rate 
(%) 
7.515 4.996 
0.570 
(PT, 2012) 
24.560 
(GR, 1994) 
572 
output gap 
(% of potential GDP) 
0.089 2.350 
-11.915 
(GR, 2012) 
7.709 
(PT, 1972) 
581 
inflation 
(annual %) 
5.813 5.583 
-4.480 
(IE, 2009) 
28.783 
(PT, 1984) 
561 
m3 
(% of GDP) 
69.512 26.540 
6.865 
(IE, 1981) 
180.332 
(UK,2009) 
543 
   
                                                          
3
 We do not consider Luxembourg due to the lack of data in some of the major variables. 
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To assess the impact of certain events on authorities’ policies, we have created 
several dummy variables and included them in the regressions: 
 dmt: dummy for the Maastricht Treaty, assuming a value of 1 in the years of and 
after the approval of the Treaty
4
, and 0 otherwise; 
 dsgp: dummy for the adoption of the SGP framework, taking the value 1 for 
1997 and subsequent years, and 0 elsewhere; 
 dez: dummy for countries in the Euro area, being 1 for the year of and after they 
became Euro area countries
5
, and 0 for Denmark, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, since they have not adopted the Euro. 
Although we do not consider this as a dummy variable, we also want to study 
the effect a crisis can have on monetary and fiscal policies. Therefore, from the 
database
6
 of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), we collected data regarding the total number 
of crises a country had in each year (crisis). In this dataset, the types of crises are 
banking, currency, inflation and stock market crises, which assume the character of a 
dummy variable in further tests (e.g. 1, if in year t country i had a banking crisis, and 0 
otherwise). 
 
3.2. Econometric Approach 
We use a panel data approach, as it notably provides the possibility of obtaining 
a larger sample. The general linear model is the foundation of linear panel model 
estimation, which is why we can estimate the parameters using the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) method. This method is associated with three basic assumptions: 
exogenous covariates, uncorrelated and homoscedastic errors. However, if they do not 
hold, OLS estimates are biased and/or inefficient. Plus, OLS bias could also be due to 
endogeneity whenever there are, for instance, omitted variables or measurement errors 
in the covariates. To address this problem we use two conventional regression based 
strategies: the fixed effects model and the two stage least squares (2SLS). 
According to Wooldridge (2009), the fixed effects method allows for not only 
the estimation of panel data models with unobserved effects, as it is efficient when 
                                                          
4
 The dates of the Maastricht referendum approval are different for each country: 1992 for Belgium, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain; 1993 for Denmark, Germany and the 
United Kingdom; 1994 for Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
5
The date of entry is different among countries: 1999 for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain; 2001 for Greece. 
6
 Available at: http://www.reinhartandrogoff.com/data/browse-by-topic/.  
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idiosyncratic errors are uncorrelated and homoscedastic, but also for the estimation of 
unbalanced panels, i.e., when the sample is missing years for some cross-sectional units.  
Additionally, although the random effects method is more efficient when the 
unobserved effect is uncorrelated with all the explanatory variables, fixed effects is 
more useful to estimate ceteris paribus effects. However, it is possible to perform the 
Hausman test to verify which of both methods is the most appropriate, with random 
effects being the null-hypothesis. Therefore, rejecting the null-hypothesis proves 
evidence in favour of fixed effects. For our work, this same test indicates the use of 
random-effects for monetary policy, as well as for the reaction function of central 
banks, and the use of fixed-effects for fiscal policy and the reaction function of national 
governments. 
The third method we use is the 2SLS, to allow for instrumental variable 
estimations. By enabling the use of instrumental variables – exogenous variables, totally 
uncorrelated with the error term and partially correlated with the explanatory variables – 
besides the existing explanatory variables, this method also estimates ceteris paribus 
effects. Therefore, it solves the endogeneity problem and leads to a consistent estimator 
when there are omitted variables. The advantage is that, if those instrumental variables 
are not poor, then they may very well satisfy the two properties mentioned above; 2SLS 
clearly becomes a more suitable method than OLS. In our 2SLS estimations, we 
generally used the lagged values of explanatory variables as instrumental variables. 
OLS, OLS-Fixed Effects (OLS-FE) and 2SLS are the three panel data methods 
considered in the estimation of our regressions, and in all of them, we apply the White 
diagonal covariance matrix in order to assume residual heteroscedasticity. 
In order to make a more complete analysis through studying the impact that 
monetary and fiscal authorities have on each country, we decided to develop a system of 
equations formed with the equations related to each country. The type of linear system 
of equations we use is the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model, proposed by 
Zellner (1962). In this context, when the error terms are correlated in the different 
regression equations and when a diverse group of explanatory variables is included in 
those equations, the corresponding estimators become more efficient than in one single 
equation estimation. 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Policies of the Authorities 
4.1.1. Monetary Policy 
In our study, as well as in the majority of the literature who follows the Taylor 
rule, the instrument of monetary policy used is the interest rate. Regarding the 
explanatory variables, for instance, Huchet (2003) uses the lagged short-term interest 
rate, the inflation gap and the M3 growth gap compared to its 2% target and a 4.5% 
reference value, respectively, and also the output gap. Altavilla (2003) creates 
instrument rules which vary between inflation, output gap and interest rate, and their 
lagged values and an autoregressive term.  
Therefore, we have set up our monetary policy regression for country i (i=1,..., 
N) at time t (t=1,..., T) in the following form: 
 
itititititiit um3outputgapinflationinterestinterest   1111  , (3) 
 
where 
itinterest  and 1itinterest are the nominal short-term interest rate at times t and t-
1, 
1itinflation  represents inflation in period t-1, 1itoutputgap  is the gap in t-1, 1itm3  is 
the monetary aggregate M3 at time t-1, i  represents the estimated individual effects for 
each country and itu  are the independent disturbances across countries 
In Table 2 we present the estimated results for regression (3) and, as expected, 
the short-term interest rate is sensitive to inflation ( 0 ), to the output gap ( 0 ) 
and to M3 ( 0 ). The estimation is conducted based on three methods, OLS, OLS-FE 
and 2SLS.
7
 The results display statistically significance in all variables, with the correct 
signs.  
Apart from the larger impact of the lagged short-term interest rate, which softens 
interest rate fluctuations, inflation is the next most important variable in terms of 
influence on the instrument of monetary policy. The results show that a 1% increase in 
inflation leads to a raise of 0.165% in the nominal short-term interest rate, in order to 
reduce money supply, which will eventually lead to a decrease in inflation. Thus the 
stabilisation of the price level is in place. Clearly, sustainable economic growth is in the 
background, which is represented by the low positive effect that output gap has on 
                                                          
7
 Both OLS and 2SLS estimations are based on cross-section random-effects, as the Hausman test 
indicates that they are the appropriate effects to consider. 
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interest rates. This also stresses the adversarial relationship mentioned earlier between 
sustainable economic growth and a stable level of prices. Looking at the results in more 
detail, a negative relation between interest rate and M3 is clear. Perhaps this could mean 
that if central banks want to increase M3, they should reduce interest rates in order to 
not jeopardise M3’s reference value. 
 
Table 2 
Estimation of monetary policy with 
itinterest  as dependent variable: 1970-2012 
Method OLS OLS-FE 2SLS 
c 
1.190*** 
(0.343) 
1.315*** 
(0.416) 
1.226*** 
(0.384) 
1itinterest  
0.789*** 
(0.029) 
0.784*** 
(0.029) 
0.790*** 
(0.034) 
1itinflation  
0.162*** 
(0.027) 
0.165*** 
(0.029) 
0.165*** 
(0.031) 
1itoutputgap  
0.093** 
(0.037) 
0.090** 
(0.037) 
0.098*** 
(0.038) 
1itm3  
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.012*** 
(0.004) 
-0.011*** 
(0.004) 
Obs 513 513 497 
2R  0.879 0.880 0.879 
Adj. 2R  0.878 0.876 0.878 
D-W stat 2.055 2.057 2.067 
Hausman prob 0.9232 - 0.9567 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The robust 
standard errors are in brackets. Obs represents the total number of observations. D-W stat is the Durbin-
Watson statistic. Hausman prob refers to the probability reached in the Hausman test.  
 
Applying the SUR model in regression (3), formed by a system of 14 equations 
related to each country individually, we were able to estimate their monetary policies 
and thus carry out a more careful analysis through the results displayed in Table 3. 
Denmark, Finland, France, Spain and Sweden are the only countries that follow 
the usual pattern: inflation is statistically significant and there are expected signs for all 
coefficients. Some other countries either do not display the expected sign or inflation 
seems to be less of a priority goal. For instance, whenever inflation is not significant, 
cyclical conditions or M3 levels assume a more relevant role: in Austria and in the 
United Kingdom, the major responses being to the levels of output (if they approach the 
potential level) and to the values established for M3, since both significantly influence 
short-term interest rates. On the other hand, in Ireland and in the Netherlands interest 
rates are only affected by M3 and output gap levels, respectively.  
Belgium and Germany are an exception to the rule because apparently, nominal 
short-term interest rate is only influenced by its auto-regressive term. 
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Table 3 
SUR estimation of monetary policy with 
itinterest  as dependent variable: 1970-2012 
Countries c 1itinterest  1itinflation  1itoutputgap  1itm3  Obs 2R  
Austria 
4.988*** 
(1.518) 
0.582*** 
(0.078) 
-0.083 
(0.107) 
0.248** 
(0.109) 
-0.033*** 
(0.016) 
40 0.674 
Belgium 
2.989*** 
(1.146) 
0.600*** 
(0.078) 
0.116 
(0.074) 
-5.71E-05 
(0.106) 
-0.016 
(0.011) 
40 0.756 
Denmark 
2.163 
(2.070) 
0.689*** 
(0.083) 
0.188** 
(0.091) 
0.117 
(0.106) 
-0.016 
(0.030) 
42 0.827 
Finland 
4.280*** 
(1.577) 
0.684*** 
(0.056) 
0.118* 
(0.062) 
0.083 
(0.059) 
-0.052* 
(0.027) 
42 0.865 
France 
3.216*** 
(1.060) 
0.570*** 
(0.071) 
0.175*** 
(0.064) 
0.071 
(0.082) 
-0.020 
(0.015) 
42 0.766 
Germany 
2.582 
(1.608) 
0.723*** 
(0.253) 
-0.356 
(0.316) 
0.124 
(0.147) 
-0.012 
(0.012) 
20 0.683 
Greece 
-2.899 
(2.728) 
0.818*** 
(0.089) 
0.245*** 
(0.071) 
0.177 
(0.151) 
0.029 
(0.029) 
32 0.930 
Ireland 
4.869*** 
(1.039) 
0.598*** 
(0.076) 
0.011 
(0.051) 
0.080 
(0.075) 
-0.035*** 
(0.010) 
41 0.852 
Italy 
3.482*** 
(1.240) 
0.575*** 
(0.068) 
0.268*** 
(0.067) 
-0.061 
(0.137) 
-0.026 
(0.019) 
42 0.841 
Netherlands 
3.398*** 
(0.773) 
0.462*** 
(0.073) 
0.004 
(0.069) 
0.205** 
(0.084) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
42 0.598 
Portugal 
0.366 
(1.092) 
0.764*** 
(0.047) 
0.164*** 
(0.035) 
0.001 
(0.063) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
42 0.943 
Spain 
2.983* 
(1.525) 
0.616*** 
(0.090) 
0.271*** 
(0.075) 
0.034 
(0.122) 
-0.018 
(0.012) 
35 0.896 
Sweden 
2.116 
(1.500) 
0.650*** 
(0.112) 
0.273* 
(0.143) 
0.072 
(0.135) 
-0.015 
(0.025) 
30 0.851 
United 
Kingdom 
5.214*** 
(1.239) 
0.421*** 
(0.144) 
0.265 
(0.219) 
0.391*** 
(0.391) 
-0.024*** 
(0.008) 
23 0.861 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The robust 
standard errors are in brackets. Obs represents the total number of observations. SUR linear estimation 
after one-step weighting matrix; total system with 513 observations.  
 
 4.1.2. Fiscal Policy 
The assessment for fiscal policy is usually based on the primary budget balance, 
in order for governments to achieve a certain level of primary surplus to diminish the 
outstanding stock of public debt. Therefore, the primary balance is commonly used as 
the dependent variable in the regressions for fiscal rules (or fiscal reaction functions). 
However, the explanatory variables included in the regressions also differ from author 
to author. Galí and Perotti (2003) use expected output gap, debt at the time of budget 
decision (relative to potential output) and the last year cyclically unadjusted total budget 
deficit (as a percentage of GDP). In addition, Bohn (1998) includes the ratio of debt to 
aggregate income, the level of temporary government spending and a business cycle 
indicator. 
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The fiscal policy regression we follow is notably presented by Afonso (2005), 
and is a simple linear dynamic model: 
 
   itititiit udebtcapbcapb   11  , (4) 
 
where the cyclically-adjusted primary balance of country i at year t (
itcapb ) depends on 
its previous observation (
1itcapb ) and on the debt-to-GDP ratio of year t-1 ( 1itdebt ).  
Bearing this in mind, the hypothesis we want to test is 0 , meaning that the 
expected result is a positive reaction of the primary balance to changes in government 
debt. Table 4 reports the outcomes for fiscal policy reaction function (4), and as the 
estimated coefficient for debt is statistically significant we cannot reject this hypothesis.  
 
Table 4 
Estimation of fiscal policy with 
itcapb  as dependent variable: 1970-2012 
Method OLS OLS-FE 2SLS 
c 
-0.491*** 
(0.226) 
-1.448*** 
(0.312) 
-1.636*** 
(0.354) 
1itcapb  
0.822*** 
(0.074) 
0.741*** 
(0.089) 
0.729*** 
(0.072) 
1itdebt  
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.027*** 
(0.005) 
0.030*** 
(0.005) 
Obs 428 428 414 
2R  0.678 0.703 0.701 
Adj. 2R  0.677 0.693 0.690 
D-W stat 2.036 2.012 2.028 
Hausman prob 0.0000 - 0.000 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The robust 
standard errors are in brackets. Obs represents the total number of observations. D-W stat is the Durbin-
Watson statistic. Hausman prob refers to the probability reached in the Hausman test.  
 
In the end, the governments of these 14 EU countries raise primary budget 
surplus when facing increases in the outstanding stock of government debt. This 
stabilising behaviour by governments, especially in adjusting the intertemporal budget 
constraint, translates into a Ricardian fiscal regime. Bohn (1998), Favero (2002) and 
Afonso (2005) also reached the same conclusion in their studies. In the three methods, 
all the estimated coefficients are statistically significant. Nevertheless, it is when we use 
the 2SLS method, with cross-section fixed effects, that the primary balance reacts more 
positively to government debt, by rising 0.3% when the debt ratio increases by 10%. 
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Subsequently, we have estimated the fiscal policy reaction functions in each 
country separately, using the SUR model. Table 5 shows the results. 
 
Table 5 
SUR estimation of fiscal policy with 
itcapb  as dependent variable: 1970-2012 
Countries c 1itcapb  1itdebt  Obs 
2R  
Austria 
-1.604** 
(0.753) 
0.228* 
(0.136) 
0.033** 
(0.013) 
36 0.314 
Belgium 
-2.893*** 
(0.861) 
0.716*** 
(0.077) 
0.034*** 
(0.009) 
42 0.827 
Denmark 
-0.367 
(0.464) 
0.774*** 
(0.076) 
0.025*** 
(0.009) 
41 0.760 
Finland 
1.440* 
(0.857) 
0.715*** 
(0.105) 
-0.009 
(0.016) 
35 0.610 
France 
0.098 
(0.346) 
0.572*** 
(0.125) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
34 0.507 
Germany 
-4,155** 
(1.758) 
0.053 
(0.156) 
0.074** 
(0.029) 
21 0.170 
Greece 
-2.744 
(1.867) 
0.671*** 
(0.108) 
0.027 
(0.018) 
24 0.588 
Ireland 
-2.488 
(1.769) 
0.624*** 
(0.114) 
0.040* 
(0.023) 
27 0.550 
Italy 
-5.683*** 
(1.716) 
0.636*** 
(0.103) 
0.059*** 
(0.017) 
32 0.865 
Netherlands 
-0.786 
(0.779) 
0.619*** 
(0.097) 
0.021 
(0.013) 
37 0.540 
Portugal 
-2.446** 
(0.998) 
0.510*** 
(0.119) 
0.035** 
(0.017) 
35 0.294 
Spain 
-4.173** 
(1.877) 
0.994*** 
(0.119) 
0.075** 
(0.034) 
17 0.766 
Sweden 
-0.369 
(1.118) 
0.572*** 
(0.100) 
0.030* 
(0.018) 
19 0.586 
United Kingdom 
-2.764*** 
(0.975) 
0.934*** 
(0.084) 
0.059*** 
(0.021) 
26 0.742 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The robust 
standard errors are in brackets. Obs represents the total number of observations. SUR linear estimation 
after one-step weighting matrix; total system with 428 observations.  
 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom have governments that follow Ricardian fiscal regimes: debt is 
statistically significant and whenever it increases, primary budget surplus is raised in 
order to stabilise the financial situation. This pattern is also pursued by Greece and the 
Netherlands, although debt does not show up as being significant.  
Finland and France represent the exceptions to this fiscal behaviour, as the debt 
estimated coefficient is negative but also not statistically significant. 
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4.2. Interactions between Monetary and Fiscal Authorities 
Besides estimating the policies of each authority, we have also decided to 
include fiscal (monetary) variables in the monetary (fiscal) regression, to highlight, in a 
different way, the real concerns of national governments and central banks, along the 
lines of Wyplosz (1999). Hence we will be able to identify the interactions between 
monetary policy and fiscal policy – which is one of the goals of our study. 
 
4.2.1. Reaction Function of the Central Banks 
Wyplosz (1999) presents a reaction function for central banks, based on several 
explanatory variables: interest rate lagged, inflation lagged, output gap lagged, money 
growth lagged, relative unit labour costs, US interest rate, primary surplus lagged (% of 
GDP), change in primary surplus lagged (% of GDP) and current account (% of GDP).  
Our regression is simpler, adding only to equation (3) the most important fiscal 
variable, which is the change in cyclically-adjusted primary balance of country i at time 
t-1 (
1 itcapb ):  
  
ititititititiit ucapbm3outputgapinflationinterestinterest   11111  .     (5) 
 
The estimation for central banks’ reaction function is presented in Table 6. 
Whilst estimating regression (5), the expected results are 0,   and 0,  , and as 
the three methods meet these hypotheses, we continue to focus on the 2SLS estimation.
8
 
The two main conclusions from this estimation are: 1) central banks are 
concerned with price stability and economic growth, and with an intermediate goal 
regarding monetary aggregates; and, on the other hand, 2) central banks do not appear to 
react much to a country’s fiscal stance. 
Nevertheless, the results exhibit statistical significance for the estimated 
coefficients of inflation, output gap and M3: whenever there is a 1% increase in the 
previous year’s rate of inflation or output gap, central banks raise the short-term interest 
rate by 0.183% and 0.117%, respectively; and an increase of 1% of M3 implies a 
decrease of 0.012% of interest rate to meet the goal. Also, the estimated coefficient for 
the change in the primary balance is not significant, which means central banks do not 
respond in this way to fiscal policy.  
                                                          
8
 With cross-section random effects, due to Hausman test’s proof. 
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Table 6 
Estimation of central banks’ reaction function with 
itinterest  as dependent variable: 
1970-2012 
Method OLS OLS-FE 2SLS 
c 
1.183*** 
(0.366) 
1.302*** 
(0.453) 
1.266*** 
(0.388) 
1itinterest  
0.785*** 
(0.037) 
0.781*** 
(0.037) 
0.775*** 
(0.039) 
1itinflation  
0.178*** 
(0.039) 
0.184*** 
(0.042) 
0.183*** 
(0.043) 
1itoutputgap  
0.117*** 
(0.038) 
0.116*** 
(0.039) 
0.117*** 
(0.039) 
1itm3  
-0.011*** 
(0.004) 
-0.013*** 
(0.005) 
-0.012*** 
(0.004) 
1 itcapb  
-0.013 
(0.035) 
-0.012 
(0.035) 
-0.012 
(0.034) 
Obs 413 413 409 
2R  0.892 0.893 0.893 
Adj. 2R  0.891 0.888 0.888 
D-W stat 1.947 1.964 1.950 
Hausman prob 0.9469 - 0.9785 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The robust 
standard errors are in brackets. Obs represents the total number of observations. D-W stat is the Durbin-
Watson statistic. Hausman prob refers to the probability reached in the Hausman test. 
  
Table 7 displays the results for a SUR estimation regarding to the central bank’s 
reaction function of each country. According to Wyplosz (1999), a positive sign for the 
estimated primary balance coefficient implies a complementary relation between both 
authorities. However, in all countries, apart from Belgium and Spain, the cyclically-
adjusted primary balance is not statistically significant, which is what we already 
expected, given the panel results: based on the lack of evidence concerning central 
banks’ response to fiscal policy.  
Comparing these results to the benchmark SUR estimation of monetary policy, 
in most of these countries, their respective interest rates are influenced by the same, or 
additional factors, such as Austria, Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and the United 
Kingdom. 
In the case of Spain, the primary balance is statistically significant and it also 
presents different signs for the estimated coefficients of inflation and M3, and its 
interest rate is affected by all monetary variables (when before, it was just positively 
influenced by inflation). 
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Table 7 
SUR estimation of central banks’ reaction function with 
itinterest  as dependent 
variable: 1970-2012 
Countries c 1itinterest  1itinflation  1itoutputgap  1itm3  1 itcapb  Obs 2R  
Austria 
5.860*** 
(2.130) 
0.633*** 
(0.110) 
-0.104 
(0.176) 
0.308** 
(0.132) 
-0.045** 
(0.022) 
0.118 
(0.113) 
33 0.744 
Belgium 
3.454*** 
(1.275) 
0.646*** 
(0.087) 
0.122 
(0.079) 
-0.030 
(0.115) 
-0.027** 
(0.012) 
-0.276*** 
(0.093) 
39 0.815 
Denmark 
2.509 
(2.493) 
0.785*** 
(0.094) 
0.110 
(0.120) 
0.181 
(0.124) 
-0.028 
(0.036) 
-0.047 
(0.164) 
41 0.785 
Finland 
6.236*** 
(1.802) 
0.739*** 
(0.064) 
0.046 
(0.086) 
0.141** 
(0.063) 
-0.091*** 
(0.031) 
-0.166 
(0.104) 
37 0.664 
France 
2.896*** 
(1.107) 
0.617*** 
(0.076) 
0.004*** 
(0.075) 
0.152* 
(0.092) 
-0.028* 
(0.015) 
0.081 
(0.150) 
34 0.546 
Germany 
1.844 
(1.309) 
0.824*** 
(0.199) 
-0.541** 
(0.253) 
0.117 
(0.118) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
0.034 
(0.049) 
20 0.286 
Greece 
0.430 
(2.350) 
0.605*** 
(0.095) 
0.615*** 
(0.106) 
-0.073 
(0.145) 
-0.018 
(0.026) 
-0.186 
(0.126) 
24 0.698 
Ireland 
2.366 
(1.904) 
0.705*** 
(0.122) 
0.041 
(0.137) 
0.121 
(0.092) 
-0.015 
(0.017) 
-0.023 
(0.042) 
27 0.615 
Italy 
1.302 
(1.322) 
0.729*** 
(0.072) 
0.225** 
(0.286) 
0.158 
(0.116) 
-0.011 
(0.019) 
-0.134 
(0.108) 
32 0.894 
Netherlands 
3.175*** 
(1.048) 
0.532*** 
(0.090) 
0.050 
(0.088) 
0.186 
(0.117) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
0.182 
(0.118) 
37 0.606 
Portugal 
1.445 
(1.629) 
0.619*** 
(0.064) 
0.300*** 
(0.050) 
0.348*** 
(0.092) 
-0.008 
(0.016) 
0.060 
(0.081) 
35 0.382 
Spain 
0.681 
(0.833) 
0.740*** 
(0.102) 
-0.507*** 
(0.161) 
0.356*** 
(0.079) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
0.374*** 
(0.082) 
17 0.776 
Sweden 
-0.236 
(1.567) 
0.908*** 
(0.200) 
-0.331 
(0.322) 
0.161 
(0.157) 
0.020 
(0.023) 
-0.103 
(0.171) 
19 0.662 
United 
Kingdom 
4.694*** 
(1.321) 
0.478*** 
(0.164) 
0.180 
(0.235) 
0.371** 
(0.161) 
-0.021** 
(0.009) 
0.023 
(0.113) 
23 0.712 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The robust 
standard errors are in brackets. Obs represents the total number of observations. SUR linear estimation 
after one-step weighting matrix; total system with 413 observations.  
 
4.2.2. Reaction Function of the National Governments 
For the fiscal reaction function, we follow the same approach as Wyplosz 
(1999), with regards to the choice of explanatory variables, but without relative unit 
labour costs. Still, we have decided to introduce the first-differences of the short-term 
interest rate, in order to attain most of the expected results. Hence, the regression is 
presented as follow: 
 
      . (6) 
 
 The estimated results are summarised in Table 8. Naturally, primary balance 
stills reacts positively to government debt ( )0 , and its impact is larger than when 
we consider the simple fiscal policy reaction function (4). Output gap is also statistically 
ititititititiit udebtoutputgapinflationinterestcapbcapb   11111 
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significant and the result is the expected one ( 0 ). In fact, governments are 
concerned with cyclically conditions: whenever the output gap deteriorates by 1%, the 
primary balance improves by 0.245%. 
 
Table 8 
Estimation of national governments’ reaction function with 
itcapb  as dependent 
variable: 1970-2012 
Method OLS OLS-FE 2SLS 
c 
-0.624 
(0.393) 
-3.236*** 
(0.708) 
-3.280*** 
(0.606) 
1itcapb  
0.819*** 
(0.078) 
0.707*** 
(0.084) 
0.702*** 
(0.068) 
1 itinterest  
-0.012 
(0.053) 
-0.029 
(0.051) 
-0.143 
(0.143) 
1itinflation  
0.014 
(0.035) 
0.123*** 
(0.046) 
0.134*** 
(0.039) 
1itoutputgap  
0.062 
(0.050) 
0.199*** 
(0.060) 
0.245** 
(0.123) 
1itdebt  
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.047*** 
(0.008) 
0.047*** 
(0.007) 
Obs 423 423 410 
2R  0.680 0.725 0.723 
Adj. 2R  0.676 0.713 0.711 
D-W stat 2.029 2.064 2.149 
Hausman prob 0.000 - 0.000 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The robust 
standard errors are in brackets. D-W stat is the Durbin-Watson statistic. Hausman prob refers to the 
probability reached in the Hausman test. 
  
The significance of inflation is also interesting. Therefore, the fiscal authority 
must achieve the necessary levels of primary budgetary surpluses, to ensure that its 
budget constraint is consistent with the price level determined by the monetary 
authority. The results precisely show a reduction of 0.134% in the cyclically adjusted 
budget deficit after a 1% increase in inflation. This is the basic process that occurs in a 
Ricardian fiscal regime. 
 In all of the methods used to estimate the regression, the interest rate variation is 
the only variable that is not statistically significant. Yet, the displayed signal is the 
expected one ( 0 ), indicating again that there is a substitution relationship between 
both authorities: whereby increases in interest rate lead to a more relaxed fiscal policy, 
as mentioned by Wyplosz (1999). 
Once again, we have estimated a SUR model to study how national fiscal 
reaction functions behave in each country separately. Naturally, the expected result is a 
statistically significance coefficient for the debt ratio with a positive effect on the 
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measure of fiscal stance. Excluding France and Spain, Table 9 shows that result for all 
countries, which shows that their governments follow a Ricardian fiscal regime. 
  
Table 9 
SUR estimation of national governments’ reaction function with 
itcapb  as dependent 
variable: 1970-2012 
Countries c 1itcapb  1itΔinterest   1itinflation   1itoutputgap  1itdebt  Obs 2R  
Austria 
-2.987** 
(1.227) 
0.101 
(0.119) 
0.169* 
(0.092) 
0.040 
(0.120) 
0.430*** 
(0.115) 
0.056*** 
(0.017) 
36 0.504 
Belgium 
-3.368*** 
(1.244) 
0.663*** 
(0.094) 
-0.116 
(0.128) 
0.023 
(0.092) 
0.203 
(0.174) 
0.039*** 
(0.011) 
41 0.828 
Denmark 
-0.909 
(0.732) 
0.736*** 
(0.081) 
-0.089 
(0.094) 
0.029 
(0.058) 
0.172* 
(0.090) 
0.035*** 
(0.011) 
41 0.785 
Finland 
-1.822 
(1.224) 
0.667*** 
(0.105) 
-0.037 
(0.150) 
0.313*** 
(0.088) 
0.180* 
(0.094) 
0.054** 
(0.023) 
37 0.664 
France 
-0.412 
(0.719) 
0.652*** 
(0.127) 
-0.036 
(0.104) 
0.045 
(0.057) 
-0.096 
(0.090) 
-0.001 
(0.0113) 
34 0.546 
Germany 
-5.945* 
(3.327) 
-0.078 
(0.153) 
0.574 
(0.400) 
0.415 
(0.370) 
-0.102 
(0.325) 
0.094** 
(0.046) 
20 0.286 
Greece 
-13.606*** 
(4.013) 
0.667*** 
(0.094) 
-0.371** 
(0.145) 
0.319*** 
(0.089) 
0.320 
(0.250) 
0.107*** 
(0.034) 
24 0.698 
Ireland 
-7.022*** 
(2.495) 
0.421*** 
(0.131) 
0.102 
(0.541) 
1.133*** 
(0.417) 
0.246 
(0.390) 
0.061** 
(0.029) 
27 0.615 
Italy 
-16.433*** 
(3.776) 
0.454*** 
(0.105) 
-0.044 
(0.144) 
0.286*** 
(0.099) 
0.104 
(0.158) 
0.151*** 
(0.032) 
32 0.894 
Netherlands 
-2.855** 
(1.133) 
0.691*** 
(0.096) 
0.270** 
(0.118) 
0.238** 
(0.097) 
-0.251** 
(0.126) 
0.043*** 
(0.016) 
37 0.606 
Portugal 
-5.943*** 
(1.798) 
0.473*** 
(0.111) 
-0.223 
(0.156) 
0.126** 
(0.055) 
0.370*** 
(0.126) 
0.073*** 
(0.024) 
35 0.382 
Spain 
-4.187* 
(2.458) 
0.984*** 
(0.203) 
-0.399 
(0.402) 
0.399 
(0.488) 
-0.116 
(0.265) 
0.050 
(0.039) 
17 0.776 
Sweden 
0.251 
(1.314) 
0.330** 
(0.136) 
0.173 
(0.199) 
-0.452** 
(0.210) 
0.168 
(0.164) 
0.047** 
(0.019) 
19 0.662 
United 
Kingdom 
-5.270*** 
(1.467) 
0.810*** 
(0.098) 
-0.289 
(0.237) 
-0.002 
(0.146) 
0.446* 
(0.253) 
0.103*** 
(0.028) 
23 0.712 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The robust 
standard errors are in brackets. Obs represents the total number of observations. SUR linear estimation 
after one-step weighting matrix; total system with 423 observations.  
 
Regarding monetary variables, firstly, none of these variables have statistical 
significance in Belgium and Germany. Secondly, in some countries, only one monetary 
variable comes up as being relevant to determine the necessary primary budget surplus, 
such as in the cases of Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In 
Austria, Finland, Greece and Portugal, the primary balance suffers the impact of two 
monetary variables, with the Netherlands being the only country where fiscal policy is 
determined by considering changes in short-term interest rate and levels of output gap 
and inflation. To sum up, fiscal developments at country level are more sensitive to the 
price level and to cyclical conditions.  
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 Comparing this test to the SUR estimation of central banks’ reaction function, 
the results lead us to conclude that the relationship between a national government and 
its central bank does not change in both estimations when the interest rate is statistically 
significant. For example, the short-term interest rates from Austria and the Netherlands 
positively influence primary balance, which suggests a complementary relationship; 
whilst the negative sign for Greece’s interest rate suggests a substitution relationship. 
However, if interest rate is not significant, then the relationship between both authorities 
could change in the SUR estimations of central banks and national governments’ 
reaction functions. In the cases of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany and Italy, the 
relationship does not alter, which is contrary to France, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
 
4.3. Institutional Variables 
In this section we once again estimate regressions (3) and (4) with the goal of 
studying the effects that three institutional events – the Maastricht Treaty, the SGP and 
the introduction of the Euro – had on the monetary and fiscal policies of our country 
sample. All of these three variables are included in the previous regressions as dummy 
variables. Another event is the combination of banking, currency, inflation crises and 
even stock market crashes,
9
 which represent the total number of crises each country 
faced through time. 
Table 10 and Table 11 report the estimation results of the effects of these events 
on monetary policy and fiscal policy, respectively, using the 2SLS method
10
, with 
random and fixed effects for the estimations of monetary and fiscal policies, 
respectively, as induced by the Hausman test. 
Regarding monetary policy, the Maastricht Treaty, besides the similar, but 
smaller effect of the SGP and of the introduction of the Euro, is related to a sharp 
decline in short-term interest rate of 1.563%. This probably occurred because it was the 
initial step towards creating a more united Europe, and thus represented the so-called 
convergence process between all the EU members. Within these three events, the goals 
of central banks remain statistically significant, being namely the impact that inflation 
has on monetary policy increased along time. Nevertheless, M3 turned out to gain more 
                                                          
9
 The regression of the effect each crisis has individually on both policies is estimated through OLS, 
OLS-FE and 2SLS methods, and it is present in the Appendix – Additional Estimation Results, Table 16. 
10
 The same estimations are done with OLS and OLS-FE, and they can be found in Appendix – 
Additional Estimation Results, Tables 12 to 15. 
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relevance with the introduction of the Euro, as concerns with monetary aggregates 
reference values became secondary goals for central banks. 
 
Table 10 
2SLS estimation of institutional variables’ effect on monetary policy with 
itinterest  as 
dependent variable: 1970-2012 
Test (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
c 
2.130*** 
(0.460) 
2.016*** 
(0.473) 
1.430*** 
(0.403) 
1.161*** 
(0.389) 
1.309*** 
(0.408) 
1itinterest  
0.758*** 
(0.035) 
0.703*** 
(0.045) 
0.752*** 
(0.040) 
0.791*** 
(0.033) 
0.762*** 
(0.039) 
1itinflation  
0.108*** 
(0.031) 
0.170*** 
(0.031) 
0.175*** 
(0.032) 
0.185*** 
(0.032) 
0.192*** 
(0.032) 
1itoutputgap  
0.112*** 
(0.038) 
0.132*** 
(0.040) 
0.115*** 
(0.039) 
0.101*** 
(0.038) 
0.114*** 
(0.040) 
1itm3  
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
itdmt  
-1.563*** 
(0.290) 
 
- - - - 
itdsgp  - 
-1.306*** 
(0.310) 
- - - 
itdez  - - 
-0.645*** 
(0.222) 
- 
-0.483** 
(0.222) 
1itcrisis  - - - 
-0.619*** 
(0.152) 
-0.589*** 
(0.153) 
Obs 497 497 497 483 483 
2R  0.887 0.886 0.882 0.880 0.882 
Adj. 2R  0.886 0.881 0.881 0.879 0.880 
D-W stat 2.117 1.992 2.046 2.008 1.989 
Hausman prob 0.1719 0.4592 0.9548 0.9366 0.8827 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The robust 
standard errors are in brackets. Obs represents the total number of observations. D-W stat is the Durbin-
Watson statistic. Hausman prob refers to the probability reached in the Hausman test. 
 
The implementation of the Euro as a common currency was the major event to 
have a negative impact on fiscal policy: cyclically-adjusted primary balance decreased 
by 0.817% (Table 11). Previously, there had already been monetary union and free 
mobility of capital, which allowed for banks from the countries of the south of Europe 
to ask for loans from the banks of the north in the interbank money market – interest 
rates charged for credit to companies and households was extremely high in these 
southern countries and much lower in the northern European ones. However, this did 
not occur on account of exchange risk. When the Euro emerged, this risk disappeared, 
and southern European countries started to request more loans from the northern 
countries, which led to a further decrease in interest rates and to an increase in public 
debt, especially in those countries that took out the loans. Therefore, it became more 
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than necessary to achieve a higher primary balance to meet this increase in outstanding 
government debt. These results are in line with Baskaran (2009), who finds that the 
Maastricht treaty’s provisions did not have the expected positive effect on economic 
growth and fiscal outcomes, especially after the introduction of the Euro. Galí and 
Perotti (2003) also mention that fiscal policy did not became less countercyclical after 
the Maastricht treaty. 
 
Table 11 
2SLS estimation of institutional variables’ effect on fiscal policy with 
itcapb  as 
dependent variable: 1970-2012 
Test (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
c 
-1.609*** 
(0.346) 
-1.563*** 
(0.346) 
-1.585*** 
(0.347) 
-1.422*** 
(0.361) 
-1.391*** 
(0.365) 
1itcapb  
0.744*** 
(0.075) 
0.744*** 
(0.075) 
0.740*** 
(0.074) 
0.718*** 
(0.089) 
0.737*** 
(0.093) 
1itdebt  
0.036*** 
(0.006) 
0.035*** 
(0.005) 
0.034*** 
(0.005) 
0.030*** 
(0.006) 
0.033*** 
(0.006) 
itdmt  
-0.610** 
(0.237) 
- - - - 
itdsgp  - 
-0.681*** 
(0.223) 
- - - 
itdez  - - 
-0.817*** 
(0.237) 
- 
-0.757*** 
(0.241) 
1itcrisis  - - - 
-0.321** 
(0.153) 
-0.262* 
(0.144) 
Obs 414 414 414 400 400 
2R  0.704 0.705 0.709 0.704 0.711 
Adj. 2R  0.692 0.694 0.697 0.691 0.698 
D-W stat. 2.075 2.077 2.105 1.968 2.048 
Hausman prob 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The robust 
standard errors are in brackets. Obs represents the total number of observations. D-W stat is the Durbin-
Watson statistic. Hausman prob refers to the probability reached in the Hausman test. 
 
While introducing 
1itcrisis  as a variable, the estimated results exhibit that the 
total crises of each country had a negative impact along the period of time considered 
for both policies. Furthermore, when we carried out the tests to determine which crises 
influenced most these policies, we concluded that banking, inflation and stock market 
crises affect fiscal policy, whilst only the latter two affect monetary policy. 
The final test we carried out shows that countries belonging to the Euro area 
suffer less during periods of crisis. In terms of monetary policy, the effect ranged from  
-0.619% to -0.589%, and in the case of fiscal policy, the effect is more significant, 
ranging from -0.321% to -0.262%. According to Cukierman (2013), the Euro area has 
some particular problems when facing a financial crisis, and, for instance, bailouts have 
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to be negotiated by the governments of each country, and, without any type of support, 
some countries from the Euro area could become insolvent. Likewise, the ECB is able 
to establish stability within the monetary union, as well as being able to respect its 
foundations. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Over the last decades the study of the interactions between monetary policy and 
fiscal policy has gained more relevance, especially after the creation of the EMU, which 
led to a more distant, less cooperative, relationship. Thus, our study focused on 14 EU 
countries, and on the well-known major goals of both policies, which are dependent on 
certain economic variables, as well as trying to determine what type of interactions have 
been established. 
With regards to monetary policy, inflation is the variable which has influenced 
most the monetary instrument, in addition to output gap and M3, which is no surprise, 
as price stability is the primary goal of central banks, as proved by the results from their 
reaction function regression. In fiscal terms, primary balance followed the expected 
behaviour, by reacting positively to increases in government debt, and the reaction 
function for national governments evidenced a major concern for levels of public debt, 
and it did the same, although less so, for the levels of inflation and output gap. All of 
these conclusions can be related to Ricardian fiscal regimes. 
Certain institutional events that affected the EU, namely the Maastricht Treaty, 
the SGP and the implementation of the Euro, all have a significant effect on the policies 
followed by policy makers. However, the impact that they have on each policy differs. 
The Maastricht Treaty was the most significant event for monetary policy, as it was the 
first step towards a more united Europe; the introduction of the Euro had the greatest 
effect on fiscal policy, which was a negative one, leading to a decrease in primary 
balances. In addition, when faced by various crises over the entire period, these events 
all had a negative impact on both policies. 
In summary, the consensus assignment where monetary authority controls 
inflation and fiscal policy controls government debt, became clear. However, when 
governments attain high levels of public debt or budget deficits, then the central bank 
could assume a somewhat more dominant position, in order to tackle the fiscal problem. 
Nevertheless, our results point to the lack of evidence concerning central banks’ 
response to fiscal policy.  
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In the country individual analysis, although the majority of the countries belong 
to the EMU, i.e. monetary policy is the same, fiscal policy is completely different, 
which thus leads to a variety of interactions across countries, as well as some other 
results. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 12 
OLS estimation of institutional variables’ effect on monetary policy with 
itinterest  as 
dependent variable: 1970-2012 
Test (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
c 
1.886*** 
(0.399) 
1.779*** 
(0.397) 
1.393*** 
(0.354) 
1.065*** 
(0.344) 
1.235*** 
(0.356) 
1itinterest  
0.757*** 
(0.031) 
0.725*** 
(0.037) 
0.750*** 
(0.034) 
0.788*** 
(0.029) 
0.756*** 
(0.033) 
1itinflation  
0.124*** 
(0.027) 
0.158*** 
(0.027) 
0.168*** 
(0.028) 
0.190*** 
(0.027) 
0.193*** 
(0.027) 
1itoutputgap  
0.103*** 
(0.037) 
0.121*** 
(0.038) 
0.113*** 
(0.038) 
0.098*** 
(0.037) 
0.115*** 
(0.039) 
1itm3  
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.006* 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
itdmt  
-1.220*** 
(0.24) 
- - - - 
itdsgp  - 
-1.098*** 
(0.243) 
- - - 
itdez  - - 
-0.777*** 
(0.196) 
- 
-0.646*** 
(0.192) 
1itcrisis  - - - 
-0.606*** 
(0.143) 
-0.566*** 
(0.142) 
Obs 513 513 513 499 499 
2R  0.887 0.884 0.882 0.880 0.882 
Adj. 2R  0.886 0.883 0.881 0.879 0.881 
D-W stat 2.099 2.033 2.025 2.009 1.981 
Hausman prob 0.2769 0.3939 0.7887 0.8201 0.6436 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The robust 
standard errors are in brackets. Obs represents the total number of observations. D-W stat is the Durbin-
Watson statistic. Hausman prob refers to the probability reached in the Hausman test. 
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Table 13 
OLS estimation of institutional variables’ effect on fiscal policy with 
itcapb  as 
dependent variable: 1970-2012 
Test (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
c 
-0.406* 
(0.215) 
-0.363* 
(0.217) 
-0.398* 
(0.217) 
-0.307 
(0.239) 
-0.224 
(0.232) 
1itcapb  
0.823*** 
(0.075) 
0.824*** 
(0.076) 
0.815*** 
(0.074) 
0.818*** 
(0.077) 
0.812*** 
(0.077) 
1itdebt  
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
itdmt  
-0.247 
(0.19) 
- - - - 
itdsgp  - 
-0.378** 
(0.191) 
- - - 
itdez  - - 
-0.625*** 
(0.200) 
- 
-0.626*** 
(0.209) 
1itcrisis  - - - 
-0.326** 
(0.15) 
-0.293** 
(0.140) 
Obs 428 428 428 414 414 
2R  0.679 0.681 0.686 0.680 0.687 
Adj. 2R  0.677 0.679 0.683 0.678 0.684 
D-W stat 2.044 2.053 2.066 1.971 2.003 
Hausman prob 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The robust 
standard errors are in brackets. Obs represents the total number of observations. D-W stat is the Durbin-
Watson statistic. Hausman prob refers to the probability reached in the Hausman test. 
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Table 14 
OLS-FE estimation of institutional variables’ effect on monetary policy with 
itinterest  
as dependent variable: 1970-2012 
Test (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
c 
2.280*** 
(0.484) 
1.984*** 
(0.463) 
1.476*** 
(0.422) 
0.941** 
(0.419) 
1.087*** 
(0.426) 
1itinterest  
0.738*** 
(0.032) 
0.697*** 
(0.038) 
0.737*** 
(0.034) 
0.783*** 
(0.029) 
0.741*** 
(0.034) 
1itinflation  
0.111*** 
(0.029) 
0.158*** 
(0.029) 
0.165*** 
(0.029) 
0.201*** 
(0.028) 
0.199*** 
(0.028) 
1itoutputgap  
0.106*** 
(0.037) 
0.134*** 
(0.040) 
0.120*** 
(0.039) 
0.102*** 
(0.038) 
0.127*** 
(0.040) 
1itm3  
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
itdmt  
-1.467*** 
(0.250) 
- - - - 
itdsgp  - 
-1.384*** 
(0.267) 
- - - 
itdez  - - 
-0.997*** 
(0.244) 
- 
-0.970*** 
(0.241) 
1itcrisis  - - - 
-0.647*** 
(0.146) 
-0.607*** 
(0.145) 
Obs 513 513 513 499 499 
2R  0.888 0.885 0.883 0.881 0.882 
Adj. 2R  0.884 0.881 0.878 0.876 0.881 
D-W stat 2.082 2.012 2.008 2.015 1.981 
Hausman prob - - - - - 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The robust 
standard errors are in brackets. Obs represents the total number of observations. D-W stat is the Durbin-
Watson statistic. Hausman prob refers to the probability reached in the Hausman test. 
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Table 15 
OLS-FE estimation of institutional variables’ effect on fiscal policy with 
itcapb  as 
dependent variable: 1970-2012 
Test (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
c 
-1.429*** 
(0.311) 
-1.382*** 
(0.313) 
-1.416*** 
(0.312) 
-1.297*** 
(0.337) 
-1.282 
(0.343) 
1itcapb  
0.745*** 
(0.090) 
0.746*** 
(0.092) 
0.738*** 
(0.090) 
0.732*** 
(0.096) 
0.733*** 
(0.097) 
1itdebt  
0.032*** 
(0.005) 
0.030*** 
(0.005) 
0.031*** 
(0.005) 
0.028*** 
(0.006) 
0.031*** 
(0.006) 
itdmt  
-0.493** 
(0.198) 
- - - - 
itdsgp  - 
-0.511** 
(0.206) 
- - - 
itdez  - - 
-0.717*** 
(0.218) 
- 
-0.682*** 
(0.227) 
1itcrisis  - - - 
-0.306** 
(0.155) 
-0.258** 
(0.147) 
Obs 428 428 428 414 414 
2R  0.707 0.708 0.711 0.706 0.687 
Adj. 2R  0.695 0.697 0.700 0.694 0.684 
D-W stat 2.041 2.048 2.061 1.953 2.003 
Hausman prob - - - - - 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The robust 
standard errors are in brackets. Obs represents the total number of observations. D-W stat is the Durbin-
Watson statistic. Hausman prob refers to the probability reached in the Hausman test. 
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Table 16 
Estimation of the effects of different types of crises (dummy variables) on monetary and 
fiscal policies: 1970-2012 
Policy Monetary Policy Fiscal Policy 
Dependent 
Variable it
interest   itcapb   
Method OLS OLS-FE 2SLS OLS OLS-FE 2SLS 
c 
1.053*** 
(0.377) 
1.169** 
(0.462) 
1.071** 
(0.437) 
-0.520** 
(0.245) 
-1.519*** 
(0.345) 
-1.635*** 
(0.366) 
1itinterest  
0.799*** 
(0.029) 
0.795*** 
(0.028) 
0.799*** 
(0.037) 
- - - 
1itinflation  
0.125*** 
(0.025) 
0.127*** 
(0.028) 
0.130*** 
(0.034) 
- - - 
1itoutputgap  
0.013 
(0.045) 
0.009 
(0.046) 
0.017 
(0.046) 
- - - 
1itm3  
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.012** 
(0.006) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
- - - 
1itcapb  - - - 
0.906*** 
(0.052) 
0.817*** 
(0.083) 
0.785*** 
(0.095) 
1itdebt  - - - 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.027*** 
(0.006) 
0.029*** 
(0.006) 
itdbc  
-0.279 
(0.264) 
-0.277 
(0.277) 
-0.333 
(0.276) 
-1.119*** 
(0.361) 
-1.288*** 
(0.325) 
-1.372*** 
(0.324) 
itdcc  
-0.036 
(0.294) 
0.009 
(0.302) 
-0.074 
(0.297) 
0.206 
(0.328) 
0.371 
(0.349) 
0.358 
(0.355) 
itdic  
2.172** 
(1.035) 
2.230** 
(1.049) 
2.090** 
(1.055) 
1.106* 
(0.597) 
1.393** 
(0.629) 
1.238* 
(0.640) 
itdsmc  
0.920*** 
(0.212) 
0.955*** 
(0.215) 
0.974*** 
(0.220) 
0.235 
(0.216) 
0.431** 
(0.204) 
0.480** 
(0.205) 
Obs 483 483 467 398 398 384 
2R  0.878 0.879 0.878 0.725 0.745 0.744 
Adj. 2R  0.876 0.873 0.876 0.721 0.733 0.730 
D-W stat 1.963 1.965 1.974 1.756 1.740 1.716 
Hausman prob 0.9196 - 0.9514 0.0007 - 0.0084 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The robust 
standard errors are in brackets. Obs represents the total number of observations. D-W stat is the Durbin-
Watson statistic. Hausman prob refers to the probability reached in the Hausman test. We carried out the 
Wald test in order to test for multiple exclusion restrictions. Whilst we did not reject the null-hypothesis, 
which is that crises are not statistically significant, depending on each policy and method used. 
